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The performance overhead associated with changing tasks (the “switch cost”) usually 
diminishes when the task is specified in advance, but is rarely eliminated by 
preparation. A popular account of the “residual” (asymptotic) switch cost is that it 
reflects “task-set inertia”: carry-over of task-set parameters from the preceding trial(s). 
New evidence for one component of “task-set inertia” comes from eye-tracking, where 
the location associated with the previously (but no longer) relevant task is fixated 
preferentially over other irrelevant locations, even when preparation intervals are 
generous. Might such limits in overcoming task-set inertia in general, and “attentional 
inertia” in particular, result from suboptimal ‘scheduling’ of preparation when the time 
available is outside one’s control? In the present study the stimulus comprised three 
digits located at the points of an invisible triangle, preceded by a central verbal cue 
specifying which of three classification tasks to perform, each consistently applied to 
just one digit location. The digits were presented only when fixation moved away from 
the cue, thus giving the participant control over preparation time. In contrast to our 
previous research with experimenter-determined preparation intervals, we found no sign 
of attentional inertia for the longest preparation intervals. Self-paced preparation 
reduced but did not eliminate the performance switch cost – leaving a clear residual 
component in both RT and error rates. That the scheduling of preparation accounts for 
some, but not all, components of the residual switch cost, challenges existing accounts 
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 To perform any cognitive task requires an appropriate “task-set”: an 
organization of processing components and/or tuning of their parameters, including 
orientation of attention to relevant stimulus attributes, selection of a relevant response 
modality and set of responses, and activation of appropriate stimulus-response (S-R) 
rules (cf. Monsell, 2003, 2015). To investigate top-down control of task-set (and the 
limits of such control) researchers have often employed task-switching paradigms (for 
reviews see: Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003, 2015; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & 
Verbruggen, 2010), which contrast performance and other measures, such as brain 
activity (e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2010; Ruge, Jamadar, Zimmermann, & Karayanidis, 
2013; Richter & Yeung, 2014), or eye-movements (Longman, Lavric, & Monsell, 2013, 
2016; Longman, Lavric, Munteanu, & Monsell, 2014; Mayr, Kuhns, & Rieter, 2013), 
for task switches and task repetitions, all other things being equal. This contrast reveals, 
on switch relative to repeat trials: a longer response time and a higher error rate (“switch 
cost”, Rogers & Monsell, 1995), a posterior positive-polarity preparatory potential in 
the EEG (e.g., Karayanidis, Coltheart, Michie, & Murphy, 2003; Lavric, Mizon, & 
Monsell, 2008), one or more negative-polarity post-stimulus EEG potential(s) (e.g., 
Karayanidis et al., 2003; Astle, Jackson, & Swainson, 2006; Elchlepp, Lavric, Mizon, & 
Monsell, 2012), greater prefrontal and parietal BOLD fMRI activations (Ruge et al., 
2013; Richter & Yeung, 2014), and delays in EEG markers of task-specific processing 
(Elchlepp, Lavric, & Monsell, 2015) and in shifting the gaze to the relevant stimulus 
attribute (Longman et al., 2013, 2014; 2016; Mayr et al., 2013). 
Although the switch cost reduces, often substantially, with opportunity for 
preparation (suggesting endogenous task-set reconfiguration, TSR), there tends to 
remain a non-trivial asymptotic component. Theoretical perspectives vis-a-vis this 
“residual” component of the switch cost include accounts in terms of task-set 
reconfiguration processes that cannot occur (Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, 
4 
Meyer, & Evans, 2001; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; Meiran, Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 
2008), or occasionally “fail to engage” (De Jong, 2000) in advance of stimulus onset, as 
well as memory-based accounts which attribute the residual switch cost to associative 
re-activation by the stimulus of (elements) of competing task-sets (Wazsak, Hommel, & 
Allport, 2003; 2005), or to the greater vulnerability of working memory during a switch 
to interference from the long-term memory representations of competing task-sets 
(Mayr, Kuhns, & Hubbard, 2014). However, the account that seems to have received the 
widest acceptance thus far is that the residual switch cost reflects task-set inertia: the 
carry-over of task-set activation (and/or its inhibition) from the preceding trial(s), which 
cannot be completely suppressed through preparation (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; 
Yeung & Monsell, 2003). 
Unequivocal evidence of task-set inertia is difficult to provide using 
conventional behavioral measures, so researchers have also employed other dependent 
variables. With fMRI Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson and Cohen (2006) were able to 
demonstrate that persisting activation in brain regions associated with the previously 
(but no longer) relevant task was predictive of the magnitude of the observed RT switch 
cost; Wylie, Javitt and Foxe (2006) similarly found that the RT cost of switching to a 
motion- from a color-discrimination task was correlated with activity in neural regions 
associated with color-processing. In an eye-tracking study we required participants to 
identify either the face or the letter in a compound face-letter stimulus (Longman et al., 
2013). We found that switching induced a tendency to fixate the irrelevant stimulus 
attribute even when a cue-stimulus interval (CSI) of 800 ms provided ample opportunity 
for preparation. During a task-switch in the interval when participants made the first 
fixation on the stimulus (200-400 ms following stimulus onset), they fixated the task-
irrelevant attribute for 25% of the time they fixated the relevant attribute, as compared 
to 17% during a task repetition – a switch-induced increase of 53% in the tendency to 
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allocate attention to the irrelevant stimulus attribute. Although this finding suggested an 
attentional component of task-set inertia (which we termed attentional inertia1), the 
presence of only one irrelevant stimulus attribute allowed for an alternative 
interpretation in terms of greater overall distractibility during a switch, and the use of 
only two preparation intervals made it impossible to ascertain whether the above 
tendency was indeed ‘residual’ (asymptotic). 
More recently, we examined task-set inertia in a paradigm developed for 
investigating the dynamics of spatial attention as a component of task-set (Longman et 
al., 2014). On each trial participants were presented with three digits positioned at the 
corners of an invisible equilateral triangle (see Figure 1), and asked to perform one of 
three classifications specified by a small centrally-presented word cue (“ODD?”, 
“EVEN?”, “LOW?”, “HIGH?”, “INNER?”, or “OUTER?”; see Methods for the number 
categories in these three classification tasks) that had to be fixated at the start of the 
trial. Each classification was consistently associated with a location, so that the cue 
specified both the task and the relevant location. The use of three tasks allowed 
comparison, on switch trials, between the probabilities of fixating the location 
associated with the task relevant on the preceding trial and of fixating the location 
associated with the other irrelevant task; preferential orientating towards the former 
location would rule out a mere distractibility account. We also used four CSIs (120 ms, 
620 ms, 1020 ms and 1420 ms) to determine whether any attentional inertia was indeed 
‘residual’ (asymptotic). In a control (location switching) condition, participants 
switched locations while performing the same task throughout the experiment. At all 
CSIs, task switching induced both a delay in fixating the task-relevant region of the 
stimulus and a tendency on switch trials to orient preferentially towards the irrelevant 
                                                          
1 The term “attentional inertia” has previously been used by Kirkham, Cruess and Diamond (2003) to 
explain young children’s difficulty when shifting between sorting cards by colour or by shape. The time-
scale of the persistence of the children’s “attentional inertia” seems rather different from the transient 
one-trial inertia we detect in adults; it remains an open question how they are related. 
6 
digit location which was the relevant location on the previous trial. This attentional 
inertia was reduced in conditions with longer preparation intervals but a substantial bias 
towards fixating the previously (but no longer) relevant region was still reliable at the 
two longest CSIs, and the pattern of means in these CSIs showed that it had reached an 
asymptotic minimum. There were no comparable delays or attentional inertia in the 
(location switching) control condition. 
In the standard task-cuing experiment, the experimenter controls the cue-
stimulus interval, whether it varies from trial to trial, or is held constant over a block (as 
in Longman et al.’s studies). This raises the question of whether conforming to an 
experimenter-imposed deadline militates against optimal scheduling of reconfiguration 
of task-set components. Consider attentional inertia as documented by Longman et al. 
(2014) in the longest CSI conditions: the majority of the fixations on the previously (but 
no longer) relevant stimulus element were made early in the preparation interval, before 
the mean latency of the appropriately targeted fixations. This suggests that a time limit 
on preparation may have encouraged rapid deployment of spatial attention (before 
attentional parameters had been fully reconfigured), perhaps in order to allow other TSR 
processes to also occur during the preparation interval. This may, at least in part, 
explain the vulnerability to the carryover of the most recent attentional settings. The 
tendency to orient promptly was unlikely to be due to insufficient preparation time – 
indeed our longest CSI of 1420 ms was rather generous (in task-switching experiments 
asymptotic preparation is typically achieved well within one second). Instead, it was 
more likely due to the difficulty in optimizing the timing of the spatial orienting as part 
of readying the task-set for the arrival of the stimulus. The above logic can be extended 
to the rest of the task-set. When there is an externally-imposed deadline, the effort to 
“synchronize” one’s state of optimal readiness with the onset of the stimulus could be 
hampered by factors such as trial-to-trial variability in the duration of TSR processes 
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and the difficulty of estimating the time available for preparation, especially when the 
preparation interval changes. Subjects may therefore set suboptimal deadlines for TSR 
components/stages. 
The current experiment tested the above conjectures. The most obvious way to 
determine whether suboptimal ‘scheduling’ of TSR is responsible for the residual 
switch cost is to allow the participant to control the timing of the target stimulus onset. 
Eye-tracking makes it possible to grant the participant control over the duration of the 
preparation interval without requiring any extra behavior (such as making an extra key 
press). The cues and stimuli were identical to those used by Longman et al. (2014; see 
Figure 1), but the participant was able to initiate stimulus onset simply by shifting their 
gaze from the cue to any of the three critical stimulus regions – a gaze-contingent 
display paradigm. Although using gaze to put the CSI under the participant’s control is 
an innovation in task switching, our paradigm bears some resemblance to that used by 
Arrington, Logan and Schneider (2007), who required participants to make 
discriminative vocal or key press responses to the task cue in order to allow a separation 
of task switch costs into cue encoding costs and stimulus processing costs. However, 
our design differs from theirs in that we did not require the subject to make any 
discriminative response to the cue that they would not otherwise make, or categorize the 
cue. Instead, we simply instructed the participants to prepare for the upcoming task 
before shifting their gaze away from the cue, thus making explicit the relationship 
between the latency of the first eye-movement away from the cue and the duration of 
the preparation interval. Consequently, although the time between cue onset and the 
gaze leaving the cue in the present paradigm includes the cue encoding time, it will also 
include the duration of task preparation processes per se, whilst not adding any 
additional processing required to explicitly signal the readiness for the imperative 
stimulus. 
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Our paradigm is also reminiscent of the “strategy cuing paradigm” developed by 
Dixon and colleagues (Dixon, 1981; Dixon & Just, 1986): in a choice reaction task the 
stimulus-response mapping changed from trial to trial; a cue presented in advance 
specified the stimulus-response mapping. Subjects could take as long as they wished to 
inspect the cue, after which they could initiate the trial by pressing a foot pedal. Dixon 
et al. used the time elapsed between cue onset and trial initiation as a measure of the 
time it took to prepare a response strategy. In the task-switching domain this paradigm 
has been adapted by Hübner, Futterer and Steinhauser (2001) who, on every trial, 
presented the participants with a visual cue that specified one of two tasks and asked 
them to press a key (with the hand that was not subsequently used for responding) when 
they were ready for the target stimulus. They reported RT switch costs of 20-50 ms 
(Experiment 3)2, which seemed to suggest that self-paced preparation did not eliminate 
the switch cost. However, in their design the task cue changed on switch trials and it 
was repeated on task repeat trials – hence one cannot disentangle the ‘true’ task switch 
cost from the facilitation arising from cue repetition. (The latter has subsequently been 
found to be substantial, e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). In the 
present paradigm, the cue changed on every trial (even when the task was repeated, e.g., 
“ODD?” or “EVEN?” for the parity task), enabling us to unconfound the effects of task 
and cue change. Making the onset of the target stimulus contingent on gaze position 
may result in an extra demand – that participants ensure that their gaze does not leave 
the cue until they are prepared for the stimulus. However, the data from our previous 
eye-tracking experiment (Longman et al., 2014), showed that even in the absence of this 
requirement, participants spent a relatively long time fixating the cue (400-600 ms), and 
that there was no discernible tendency for very early eye-movements away from the cue 
                                                          
2 What the authors referred to as “shift cost” was the comparison of mixed-task blocks (containing task 
switches) with single-task blocks. However, this measure conflates the task switch cost with the “mixing 
cost” – the difference between task repetitions in mixed task blocks and single-task blocks. But the 
authors also reported the more widely accepted measure of trial-to-trial switch cost as the difference 
between switches and repetitions within mixed-task blocks – it is this analysis we refer to. 
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(<300 ms from cue onset) – hence we assume there was no obvious need to suppress 
such a tendency. Furthermore, the use of gaze-contingent displays makes it possible to 
avoid the extra manual (or foot) response required in Dixon and colleagues’ and Hübner 
and colleagues’ studies. Finally, by recording eye movements from cue onset, in 
addition to the timing and the accuracy of responses to the stimulus, it was possible to 
establish whether allowing the subject to control the duration of the CSI eliminates both 
the attentional inertia we previously reported and the residual switch cost observed in 




Eighteen participants (10 female, mean age = 21.54) were either paid £10 
(£5/hr) or awarded partial course credits plus a performance-related bonus of up to 
£4.50 for their participation. 
Tasks, stimuli and procedure 
The experiment was run using Experiment Builder (SR Research, Ottawa, 
Canada) on a flat-screen (zero curvature) 17” CRT monitor placed ~57 cm from the 
participants’ eyes. Each trial started with a blank screen followed by a centrally 
presented black fixation cross (subtending 0.4°). Allowing the subject to control the 
preparation interval means that the CSI and the response-stimulus interval (RSI) must 
necessarily be confounded. Independent manipulation of CSI and RSI has yielded 
separable effects on the switch cost, typically interpreted as reflecting endogenous TSR 
vs. passive decay of task-set, respectively (Meiran, 1996). We therefore added a design 
parameter to enable analyses that could unconfound the two kinds of effect – we 
presented the fixation cross at one of three response-fixation intervals (RFIs; 700 ms, 
1200 ms, 1700 ms; randomized over trials, but equiprobable for each task, transition 
10 
type and level of each element within the stimulus). After the fixation cross had been 
visible for 400 ms (minimum) and then fixated for a further 100 ms it was replaced with 
a task-cue (“ODD?”, “EVEN?”, “LOW?”, “HIGH?”, “INNER?”, “OUTER?” 
subtending up to 0.8° horizontally, 0.3° vertically) accompanied by three light blue dots 
(0.3° in diameter) at the locations where the digits would eventually appear (see Figure 
1). Trials on which the interval between the onset of the fixation cross and the onset of 
the cue exceeded 1000 ms were assumed to reflect problems either achieving or 
detecting fixation and were omitted from all analyses (1.07%). The cue changed on 
every trial, thereby unconfounding task switching and cue switching (Monsell & Mizon, 
2006). Participants were instructed that the cue would remain visible as long as it was 
fixated and that the stimulus would appear as soon as they moved their eyes towards 
one of the stimulus elements. This was implemented by presenting the stimulus as soon 
as the gaze crossed the boundary of one of the invisible square (side = 2°) regions 
centered on each of the three stimulus elements. Participants were explicitly informed to 
take as long as they needed to prepare for the upcoming stimulus, which would appear 
as soon as they moved their eyes away from the cue. Consequently, they controlled the 
time available for preparation. The stimulus remained on screen until a response was 
made by pressing one of the keys (‘c’ or ‘m’) on a standard QWERTY keyboard. If an 
incorrect response was made “ERROR” was displayed for 1000 ms before the start of 
the next trial. 
The stimulus comprised three digits, selected from the set 2-9 (each subtending 
0.4° horizontally, 0.5° vertically), displayed at the points of an invisible equilateral 
triangle, 5° from each other and 2.7° from the central location of the cue. The cue 
specified the classification task to apply: odd vs. even; low (≤5) vs. high (≥6); "inner" 
(4, 5, 6, 7) vs. "outer" (2, 3, 8, 9); with each task mapped to a single location throughout 
the experiment (with allocation of task to location counterbalanced over participants). 
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Stimuli were generated by first defining the level (e.g., odd, high) of each digit and then 
randomly selecting a digit from the appropriate set with two constraints: a digit could 
appear only once in a stimulus and there could be no exact repetition from the previous 
trial of the whole stimulus (the same three digits in the same locations). Stimuli were 
also controlled to ensure that the combinations of categories of the three digits (e.g., 
odd, high, outer) were equiprobable for each transition type, task and RFI. 
The tasks were equiprobable, so the task switch:repeat ratio was 2:1. We assume 
TSR, especially its preparatory component, to be endogenous, hence sensitive to 
motivational factors (cf. Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002). Thus, to encourage 
endogenous preparation, we used the following monetary incentive scheme. The mean 
RT, number of errors and a composite performance score [(mean RT in ms/10) + 
(errors*5)] were displayed at the end of each block. Bonus payments were awarded for 
improvement relative to the average performance on previous blocks. We have 
employed this incentive procedure extensively in task-switching studies, some of which 
used eye-tracking (Longman et al., 2013; 2014; 2016), and some of which did not 
(Lavric et al., 2008; Elchlepp et al., 2012; 2015) – these studies found robust behavioral, 
eye-movement and electrophysiological indices of effective preparation. 
Before the eye-tracking session, participants practiced each task in an 8-trial 
block. This was followed by a 74-trial practice task-switching block in which only one 
digit was presented centrally on each trial. Location-task mappings and the gaze-
contingent timing of the cue-stimulus interval were then introduced in two further 
practice blocks of 74 trials each, identical to the fifteen 74-trial experimental blocks that 
followed resulting in 1100 experimental trials. The whole session, including the practice 
and experimental blocks and setting up the eye-tracker, lasted two hours. 
12 
Eye-tracking 
An EyeLink 1000 eye-tracker (SR Research, Ottawa, Canada) recorded the 
movements of the right eye from the onset of the blank screen until the response with a 
sampling rate of 500 Hz; it was calibrated before each block. Four square regions (side 
= 2°) were delineated as containing ‘relevant’ information for the three digits in the 
stimulus and the cue. The proportion of all fixations to land in these regions was 
91.19% on both switch and repeat trials. The first two trials in each block, trials with 
RT>2500 ms (1.14%) and trials following an error were omitted from all analyses. Error 
trials were also omitted from RT and eye-tracking analyses. 
Only fixations initiated after cue onset were analyzed. The total dwell-time on 
each of the above-mentioned spatial regions of the stimulus within a defined time-
window (the summed duration of all fixations on the respective region within the 
respective time-window) was submitted to statistical analysis. 
In ANOVAs, the reported significance values were Huyhn-Feldt-corrected for 
sphericity violations (but dfs are reported uncorrected). 
 
Results 
Cue-stimulus interval (CSI) 
Participants spent more time fixating the cue before initiating an eye-movement 
away from it on switch (741 ms) than on repeat trials (674 ms), see the inferential 
statistics for this comparison below. In order to assess the extent to which the time taken 
to prepare influenced performance, trials were grouped into quartiles, separately for 
each participant’s switch and repeat trials, according to the duration of this self-paced 
CSI. The mean CSIs for the quartiles, averaged over switch and repeat conditions (and 
the standard deviation of the mean over participants), were: 466 (62) ms, 558 (81) ms, 
671 (115) ms, 1134 (341) ms. We also computed, as a measure of the range of CSIs for 
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each quartile, the standard deviation over individual trials for each participant; the 
averages of those over participants were: 48 ms, 48 ms, 83 ms, 519 ms. All performance 
and eye-tracking data were analyzed including these quartiles as levels of the factor 
CSI. 
Figure 2 shows the mean CSIs, RTs and errors averaged across all three tasks 
and RFIs. The CSI durations were submitted to an ANOVA with the factors Switch, 
CSI quartile, Task and RFI; this found a reliable main effect of Switch, F(1,17)=33.62, 
MSE=44339.10, p<.001, indicating that the cue was fixated for 68 ± 123 ms longer on 
switch than repeat trials. The switch-repeat difference in CSI duration increased from 
the shortest CSI quartile to the longest (Switch by CSI interaction, F(3,51)=9.95, 
MSE=46202.80, p=.005). This difference was reliable for all quartiles (main effect of 
Switch at CSI 1: 32 ± 5 ms, F(1,17)=47.83, MSE=1786.21, p<.001; CSI 2: 45 ± 6 ms, 
F(1,17)=56.02, MSE=2910.32, p<.001; CSI 3: 61 ± 10 ms, F(1,17)=38.04, 
MSE=7820.60, p<.001; CSI 4: 134 ± 32 ms, F(1,17)=17.64, MSE=81684.93, p=.001), 
suggesting that switching was associated with a significant delay in orienting task-
relevant spatial attention across the whole range of CSIs. There were no other reliable 
interactions involving the factor Switch in the analysis of CSI durations. 
RT and errors 
 An ANOVA with the factors Switch, CSI, Task and RFI on the RTs (see Figure 
2) found the RT to increase with CSI, (F(3,51)=35.71, MSE=34229.87, p<.001). There 
was a reliable overall switch cost of 82 ± 14 ms, F(1,17)=32.80, MSE=66191.01, 
p<.001, which reduced with the self-paced preparation time from 112 ± 16 ms at the 
shortest CSI quartile to 45 ± 17 ms at the longest, F(3,51)=8.34, MSE=7321.65, p<.001 
(Switch by CSI interaction). The ‘residual’ switch cost was statistically significant in 
the longest CSI quartile, F(1,17)=6.81, MSE=24573.98, p=.018; all participants but one 
had a longer mean RT on switch than repeat trials. 
                                                          
3 Standard error of the contrast. 
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 Could the effects of CSI reflect not the time available for preparation, but the 
response-stimulus interval (RSI; time available for passive dissipation after the previous 
trial)? As already mentioned (see Method) average RSI was necessarily longer at longer 
CSIs. To determine whether there was a detectable effect of RSI (which varied with 
RFI, CSI and, to a much lesser extent, the fixation-cue interval) we selected a subset of 
trials for which the RSI was within one standard deviation of the median RSI for the 
condition (collapsed across all three tasks). This resulted in a systematic variation in 
RSI with RFI (mean RSIs in order of increasing RFI were: 1858 ms, 2374 ms, 2895 
ms), yet, for the first three quartiles, the CSI was comparable for each RFI within a CSI 
quartile. The mean CSIs in order of increasing RFI for CSI quartile 1 were: 472 ms, 468 
ms, 473 ms; CSI quartile 2: 552 ms, 555 ms, 560 ms; CSI quartile 3: 650 ms, 657 ms, 
676 ms. CSI quartile 4 was not included in the analyses which examined the effect of 
RFI within each CSI because the CSI duration increased substantially and 
monotonically as a function of RFI in this quartile (mean CSIs in order of increasing 
RFI: 900 ms, 954 ms, 1003 ms) thereby confounding the time available for passive 
dissipation (whose effects we aimed to examine here) with the preparation interval. An 
ANOVA with the factors RFI and Switch on the RTs from each of the three shortest 
CSI quartiles (only including those trials selected as described above) found that the 
effects of RFI per se on overall performance were modest: the switch cost in order of 
increasing RFIs for CSI 1 was: 100 ± 18 ms, 140 ± 27 ms, 118 ± 25 ms; CSI 2: 69 ± 33 
ms, 102 ± 23 ms, 96 ± 34 ms; CSI 3: 53 ± 29 ms, 80 ± 14 ms, 86 ± 38 ms. Neither the 
main effect of RFI nor its interaction with Switch approached significance for any of the 
CSIs (all Fs<2). The results from this analysis suggest that the reduction in switch cost 
with increasing CSI cannot be explained by passive dissipation and is therefore a 
consequence of endogenous preparation – indeed, for all three CSI quartiles included in 
the analysis, the switch cost increased numerically from the shortest RFI to the longest. 
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 A reliable switch cost was also found in the errors, F(1,17)=5.13, MSE=66.43, 
p=.037, with participants making 1.0 ± 0.5% more errors on switch than on repeat trials. 
This effect was not significantly modulated by preparation, F(3,51)<1, but there was a 
reliable interaction between Switch and Task, F(2,34)=4.88, MSE=17.00, p=.014. The 
error switch cost was 1.8 ± 0.6% in the odd/even task, F(1,17)=8.89, MSE=39.21, 
p=.008, 1.2 ± 0.5% in the low/high task, F(1,17)=5.04, MSE=31.21, p=.038, and 0.07 ± 
0.5% in the inner/outer task, although the latter was not significant, F<1. 
 Analyses with CSI as a continuous variable. To ensure that the reduction in 
the RT switch cost with CSI reported above is not dependent on our choice of quantile 
for partitioning the distribution of self-paced CSI (or indeed any choice of quantile), we 
also tested the effect of CSI on the switch cost by treating CSI as a continuous variable 
in a Linear Mixed Effects (LME) analysis on single-trial RTs, using the lmer.test 
package in R. We tested five models, all of which included trial order as a fixed effect 
and participant as a random effect whose intercept was allowed to vary. Four models 
included the key interaction, CSI x Switch, along with the main effect of Switch and the 
Switch x RFI interaction, plus: no other terms (model 1); the Task x Switch interaction 
(model 2); the Task x Switch x CSI interaction (model 3); the Task x Switch x RFI 
interaction (model 4). In all four models (see Supplementary Materials for the R syntax 
and ANOVA output) CSI had a significant effect on the RT switch cost (p<.001 for the 
CSI x Switch interaction). To ascertain that the CSI x Switch interaction was not 
specific only to a subset of models, we also tested the fifth model, which contained all 
the main effects in the design (CSI, Switch, RFI and Task) and all the interactions 
among them. In this unparsimonious but comprehensive model the CSI x Switch 
interaction was again significant (p<.05). The RFI x Switch interaction was not 
significant in any of the five models tested. Thus, when we treated CSI as a continuous 
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variable, we confirmed the statistically robust effect of self-paced CSI (and no 
statistically detectable effect of RFI) on the switch cost. 
Eye-tracking 
 Delay in fixating the relevant region. Figure 3 shows the average dwell time in 
successive 20 ms bins for the three stimulus regions described above (see Method) as a 
function of switch/repeat and CSI4. Dwell time is the amount of time spent fixating each 
of the stimulus regions per 20 ms time-bin per trial. Our dwell-time measure is 
analogous to the probability of fixating a given region at a given moment in time (the 
probability can be calculated by multiplying the value presented in Figure 3 for each 20 
ms bin by 0.05). We estimated the apparent delay in appropriate orienting of attention 
on switch trials relative to repeats by first selecting a 200 ms window5 on the repeat 
curve starting from the 20 ms bin half way between cue onset and the first bin in which 
dwell time (averaged over participants) exceeded 95% of the maximum of the entire 
dwell-time function (see Figure 3, left panels, for the window boundaries). For the 
dwell-time (y axis) value at every 2 ms point on the repeat curve we estimated the delay 
in the switch curve reaching this value using the same non-linear curve fitting procedure 
as in our earlier studies (Longman et al., 2014, 2016)6. The estimated switch-related 
delays in order of increasing CSI quartile were: 131 ± 23 ms, 85 ± 13 ms, 63 ± 13 ms, 
186 ± 73 ms). Four one-sample t-tests (one for each CSI) found that the estimated delay 
was reliable for all CSIs (CSI 1: t(17)=5.74, p<.001; CSI 2: t(17)=6.51, p<.001; CSI 3: 
t(17)=4.65, p<.001; CSI 4: t(17)=2.53, p=.021). A follow up ANOVA with the factor 
                                                          
4 The apparent discrepancy between the mean CSI duration (initial fixation landing time) and the dwell 
time curves in Figure 3 (early fixations at the longest CSI are prior to the mean latency of the first fixation 
at the shortest CSI) is due to considerable variability between participants/conditions in the self-paced 
CSI durations. 
5 Because the portion of the dwell time curve with maximal rise in CSI quartile 4 was considerably longer 
than in the other CSIs, we used a 400 ms window there. 
6 In a procedure analogous to high-order spline interpolation, we fitted a 10-order polynomial (Polyfit 
function in Matlab; Mathworks, Natick, MA) to the switch curves of every subject. The real 
(noncomplex) polynomial root corresponding to a y-axis value on the repeat curve is an estimate of the 
time point at which the switch curve reached this value. Averaging these estimates within the 200-ms 
time-window defined above provided the mean temporal separation between the switch and repeat curves. 
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CSI found that the differences in the delay in appropriate attention orientation with CSI 
quartile did not approach significance, F(3,51)=2.19, MSE=65526.14, p=.154. 
 Dwell time on the irrelevant regions. The dwell time on the currently 
irrelevant regions (Figure 3, right panel) was analyzed in two contiguous 500 ms 
windows starting 200 ms after cue onset; any one of these analysis windows would fail 
to capture the interval of maximal dwell-time on these regions for all CSI quartiles, 
whereas a wider window could reduce sensitivity by ‘diluting’ potential effects by 
including portions with negligible dwell-time. ANOVAs with the factors Switch, CSI, 
Task and RFI were run on the dwell time in the early and late windows separately. Both 
analyses found a greater tendency to fixate the irrelevant regions (more dwell time) on 
switch trials than on repeat trials [early window: 5.1 ± 1.1 ms, F(1,17)=18.90, 
MSE=441.44, p<.001; late window: 6.9 ± 1.5 ms, F(1,17)=20.11, MSE=760.13, 
p<.001]. This effect was reduced at longer preparation intervals in both windows [early: 
F(3,51)=10.10, MSE=257.09, p<.001; late: F(3,51)=4.22, MSE=309.62, p=.017], but 
remained reliable (or approached significance) in all but the longest CSI quartile [early 
window: main effect of Switch in CSI 1: 12.5 ± 2.4 ms, F(1,17)=26.49, MSE=476.38, 
p<.001; CSI 2: 5.5 ± 2.5 ms, F(1,17)=4.90, MSE=506.49, p=.041; CSI 3: 2.6 ± 1.4 ms, 
F(1,17)=3.32, MSE=169.15, p=.086; CSI 4: -0.4 ± 0.4 ms, F(1,17)<1; late window: 
main effect of Switch in CSI 1: 7.5 ± 2.2 ms, F(1,17)=11.83, MSE=381.43, p=.003; CSI 
2: 9.3 ± 2.8 ms, F(1,17)=10.72, MSE=649.21, p=.004; CSI 3: 9.1 ± 2.0 ms, 
F(1,17)=21.51, MSE=309.94, p<.001; CSI 4: 1.7 ± 1.4 ms, F(1,17)=1.54, n.s.]. There 
was also a reliable interaction between Switch, CSI and Task in the early window, 
F(6,102)=4.43, MSE=294.46, p=.003, which approached significance in the late 
window, F(6,102)=2.02, MSE=359.23, p=.075. Follow-up analyses by Task found a 
systematic reduction in the tendency to fixate the irrelevant regions on switch trials 
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relative to repeats with increasing CSI (Switch by CSI interaction) only for the 
inner/outer task in the early window, F(3,51)=11.85, MSE=422.92, p<.001. 
Attentional inertia. For the crucial analysis of attentional inertia (see 
Introduction), we submitted to an ANOVA the dwell time in the currently irrelevant 
regions on switch trials with the factors Previous Relevance (previously relevant, 
previously irrelevant), CSI, Task and RFI, for the same time-windows as above. Figure 
3 (right panels) and Table 1 (which presents the data by both CSI and RFI) shows a 
tendency to fixate the previously relevant region for the two shorter CSIs, disappearing 
at the longer CSIs. In the early window this attentional inertia effect reduced as a 
function of CSI, F(3,51)=7.19, MSE=3050.00, p=.005. The effect was significant for the 
shortest CSI quartile, F(1,17)=7.93, MSE=6318.45, p=.012, but not for the second 
(F<1). For the two longest CSI quartiles the effect was even non-significantly reversed 
[CSI 3, F(1,17)=1.68, n.s.; CSI 4, F<1], indicating that attentional inertia had been 
eliminated at the longer CSIs. 
The ANOVA that examined attentional inertia in the late window found an 
overall tendency to fixate the previously relevant region less than the other irrelevant 
region, F(1,17)=7.82, MSE=1228.28, p=.012. The Previous Relevance by CSI 
interaction approached significance, F(3,51)=2.48, MSE=359.25, p=.088, but inspection 
of Table 1 shows no systematic modulation of the effect by CSI. Follow up ANOVAs 
demonstrated that the tendency to fixate the previously relevant region less than the 
other irrelevant region was reliable only for CSI quartiles 2 and 3 [main effect of 
Previous Relevance in CSI 1, F(1,17)=2.78, MSE=265.27, p=.114; CSI 2, F(1,17)=6.39, 
MSE=974.12, p=.022; CSI 3, F(1,17)=6.27, MSE=652.19, p=.023; CSI 4, F(1,17)=3.91, 
MSE=177.29, p=.064]. 
Active reduction or passive dissipation of inertia? Neither the main effect of 
RFI, F(2,34)<1, nor its interaction with Previous Relevance, F(2,34)<1, were reliable in 
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the omnibus ANOVA for the early window. To ascertain whether the above-mentioned 
reduction and elimination of our index of attentional inertia with increasing CSI 
reflected the duration of the preparation interval, rather than passive dissipation of the 
previous task-set parameters due to a correlated increase in the response-stimulus 
interval (RSI), follow up analyses were performed for the three shortest CSIs with the 
factors RFI and Previous Relevance (using only the subset of trials selected in the same 
way as for the corresponding RT analysis above, where we explained why for these 
trials the jitter in RFI is the primary source of variance in RSI, and why CSI quartile 4 
was excluded from this analysis). The main effect of RFI approached significance for 
the shortest CSI, but was not reliable for the longer CSI quartiles [main effect of RFI at 
CSI 1, F(2,34)=3.13, MSE=243.94, p=.061; CSI 2, F(2,34)=1.92, MSE=228.05, p=.168; 
CSI 3, F(2,34)=2.42, MSE=73.39, p=.104]. More importantly, the RFI by Previous 
Relevance interaction did not approach significance for any CSI (all Fs<1). In Table 1 
the reduction in the preference for the previously relevant region over RFIs is the trend 
over rows for each column; the preference is 5.3 ms in CSI 1 and <1 ms in the 
remaining CSIs. The same reduction over CSIs is the trend over columns for each row: 
~22-28 ms over different RFIs. Thus, the numerical reduction of the preference for the 
previously relevant region over the other irrelevant region with increasing RFI was 
trivially small relative to the effect of increasing CSI. Hence the effect of CSI can be 
attributed largely to the duration of the preparation interval, not to the time available for 
passive dissipation of attentional settings. 
Analyses with CSI as a continuous variable. As for the RTs, to confirm that 
these outcomes are not dependent on the choice of the CSI quantile, we ran (for both the 
early and late windows) analyses treating CSI as a continuous variable. LME analyses 
were performed on the index of attentional inertia – the previously relevant-other 
irrelevant difference – computed for individual switch trials. As for the RTs, we tested 
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the most comprehensive model including CSI, RFI and Task (and all the interactions), 
plus four restricted models that included the factors CSI and RFI with or without the 
main effect of Task or its interactions with CSI and RFI (see Supplementary Materials). 
Consistent with the distribution-based analyses above, in the early window CSI, but not 
RFI, had a significant effect on attentional inertia (main effect of CSI p<.01 in all 
models). In the late window, there were no significant effects of either CSI or RFI. 
 
Discussion 
We investigated the robustness of attentional inertia in a task-cuing experiment, 
with three tasks consistently associated with different locations in the stimulus array, 
and the duration of the preparation interval controlled by the participant. Participants 
triggered the stimulus onset by shifting their gaze from the central cue to one of the 
elements of the stimulus array, with no limit imposed on the time available for 
preparation. This use of gaze-contingent displays gave the participant control over 
preparation time but, in one respect at least, the behavioral effects observed were similar 
to those commonly reported in task-cuing experiments: there was a substantial RT cost 
of a task switch that reduced with, but was not eliminated by, a longer preparation 
interval. 
The effect of preparation interval was assessed by dividing the trials into 
quartiles based on the duration of the self-paced CSI. Because the time taken by the 
participant for preparation was necessarily confounded with the time available for 
passive dissipation, we introduced extra variability into the RSI by jittering the intertrial 
interval preceding the onset of the fixation cross (the RFI). The analysis of the effect of 
RFI and its interaction with switching in each CSI quartile, and an LME analysis 
treating CSI as a continuous variable, both clearly indicated that the reduction in switch 
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cost with increasing CSI reflected time available for active preparation, not passive 
dissipation of the previous task-set (or any other effect of an increase in RSI per se).  
One aspect of the current data concerning the relationship between CSI and 
performance is somewhat unusual in comparison to the pattern seen in the standard 
task-cuing experiments: overall mean RT was longer with increasing CSI and the 
reduction in the RT switch cost with CSI seemed to arise primarily from the increase in 
RT on repeat trials at longer CSIs (see Figure 2), whereas what one typically observes 
in task-switching experiments is an overall reduction in RT with CSI and a greater 
reduction for switches than for repeats (e.g., Monsell & Mizon, 2006). We speculate 
that this is due to fluctuation in processing efficiency over trials:  participants take 
longer to prepare when they experience a dip in processing efficiency, so that general 
performance worsens with a longer CSI. An overlap of this general trend (common to 
both switches and repeats) with a counteracting trend of switch-specific preparation can 
explain the observed trend of a smaller increase in RTs on switch trials than on repeat 
trials with an increasing CSI (and the resulting reduction in switch cost at the longer 
CSIs). This dissociation between a relative improvement in switch-specific preparation 
with increasing CSI, and a decline in overall performance, provides some support for 
the attribution of the two effects of CSI in standard task-cuing experiments to different 
sources: TSR on the one hand, and on the other the generic preparation responsible for 
the classic effect of foreperiod on RT. 
In our previous research (Longman et al., 2014, Experiment 2, see Introduction) 
we found that task switching resulted in preferential fixation of the previously relevant 
stimulus location on switch trials– attentional inertia – even when the opportunity for 
preparation was ample. In Longman et al.’s (2014) condition with a CSI of 1020 ms the 
previously (but no longer) relevant stimulus element was fixated on average for an extra 
7.8 ms per trial (an extra 82%), relative to the irrelevant stimulus element that was also 
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irrelevant on the previous trial; this effect was still 5.3 ms (62%) when the CSI was 
1420 ms. In the present experiment the attentional inertia effect was statistically 
significant only in the early window and was numerically altogether absent (even 
reversed) for the two quartiles comprising the longest CSIs (see Figure 3 and Table 1), 
even though the mean of the slowest (4th) quartile of self-determined CSIs was shorter 
than the longest experimenter-determined CSI in our previous experiment. Indeed, for 
the 4th CSI quartile in the early analysis window, the previously relevant region was 
fixated 0.02 ms per trial less than the other irrelevant region. The 95% confidence 
interval around this very small mean effect was -1.16 ms to 1.12 ms, and it is clear that 
the above-mentioned attentional inertia effects of 5-8 ms in Longman et al.’s (2014) 
long CSIs fall well outside this interval. These results suggest that the tendency to fixate 
the previously (but no longer) relevant region during a task-switch – an index of task-
dependent carryover of spatial attentional settings – can be eliminated when preparation 
is not constrained by an experimenter-defined deadline. 
It is worth noting that the mean CSI in the longest self-determined CSI quartile 
in the present study roughly equaled the mean of the two longest CSIs (1020 ms and 
1420 ms) in Longman et al. (2014, Experiment 2) for which there was clear attentional 
inertia. We compared the “residual” component of attentional inertia in the two 
experiments with an independent samples t-test contrasting the estimate of attentional 
inertia (the previously relevant-other irrelevant dwell-time difference on switch trials) in 
the current experiment vs. Longman et al.’s (2014) Experiment 2. The difference in the 
residual attentional inertia was statistically significant, t(40) = 2.17, p=.036. Comparing 
the reduction in inertia with an increasing CSI is less straightforward, because of the 
large difference between the mean CSI in the 1st quartile in the present experiment (466 
ms) and the shortest CSI of 120 ms in Longman et al. (2014). We therefore computed a 
basic average slope estimate of the reduction in inertia with preparation, by taking the 
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difference in inertia between the longest and shortest CSIs and dividing it by the 
difference in CSIs. An independent samples t-test comparing the slopes in the two 
experiments found the reduction in inertia to be significantly steeper in the present 
experiment than in Longman et al.’s (2014) Experiment 2, t(40) = 2.19, p=.034. 
Thus, similar preparation intervals resulted in markedly different fixation 
patterns depending on whether the preparation interval was determined by the 
participant (the present study) or by the experimenter (Longman et al., 2014). 
Presumably, when the duration of the preparation interval is externally determined 
(even if the interval is long) participants sometimes reorient attention before the 
appropriate settings have been updated for the current task-goal (at least on a proportion 
of trials), see Introduction. The opportunity to self-pace preparation is likely to strongly 
reduce this tendency to orient “prematurely”, allowing for more time to counteract 
“attentional inertia”. Also, an externally imposed long CSI coupled with our relatively 
poor ability to estimate temporal intervals, may encourage the participant to prepare 
early, but maintaining an optimal state of preparation for as much as a second may be 
difficult. Under self-paced conditions, the state of preparation can be used as soon as it 
is achieved. More generally, the benefit of self-paced preparation is that it allows the 
stimulus onset to be determined by the participants’ meta-awareness of their readiness. 
Assuming this meta-awareness is at least moderately accurate, self-pacing preparation 
may result in better synchronization of preparation with stimulus onset. On the trials 
when TSR, or earlier processing stages (e.g., cue encoding) happen to be slow, 
preparation can be allowed to take longer, whereas on trials when pre-TSR and TSR 
processes are effective, stimulus onset can be initiated promptly, before the newly-
reconfigured task-set parameters start to decay (see Logan & Gordon, 2001, for a 
related discussion of the time-course of preparatory executive control processes as a 
source of the switch cost). 
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We have recently identified another circumstance in which attentional inertia 
was eliminated – when instead of cues transparent with regard to the required 
categorization (as in the present experiment) we used explicit location cues: arrows and 
the spatial adverbs “TOP”, “LEFT”, and “RIGHT” (Longman et al., 2016). However, 
other measures provided very different outcomes in that study compared to the present 
investigation (and to Longman et al., 2014). First, the use of explicit location cues 
eliminated not only attentional inertia, but also the delay in fixating the task-relevant 
region (here and in Longman et al., 2014, the delay was present for all the preparation 
intervals). Second, the switch cost (and its residual component) increased substantially 
with explicit location cues relative to Longman et al.’s (2014) experiments, whereas 
here the residual cost is somewhat smaller than in the latter experiments (see below). 
One must therefore conclude that different factors led to the elimination of attentional 
inertia in Longman et al.’s (2016) study and the present study. In the former, it was the 
de-coupling of the reconfiguration of spatial attention from other task-set 
reconfiguration processes due to (quasi)automatic orienting triggered by the explicit 
location cues. In the present study, it is the more optimal scheduling of the anticipatory 
reconfiguration processes, including eye-movements to the relevant location on the 
screen, in the absence of an externally-imposed deadline. 
Although there was no sign of attentional inertia in the long CSI trials, there was 
a greater tendency to fixate either task-irrelevant digit (irrespective of its relevance on 
the preceding trial) on switch relative to repeat trials. This tendency may reflect weaker 
(and noisier) activation of attentional settings on switch trials or increased distractibility 
or some combination of the two. There was little effect of RSI (as assessed by analyzing 
RFI orthogonally to CSI) on fixations in the irrelevant regions suggesting that passive 
dissipation of attentional settings (or any other effect of an increasing RSI) cannot 
explain away the above-mentioned effects of CSI on attentional dynamics. 
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The analysis of dwell-time on the task-relevant region, displayed in the left 
panel of Figure 3, found that a task-switch delayed orientation to this region – the delay 
(whose variation over CSIs, 63-186 ms, was non-significant) was statistically 
significant for each CSI. Thus, as in our work with fixed CSIs (Longman et al., 2014), 
the delay in appropriate orienting of attention (indexing the time taken for 
reconfiguration of task-relevant attentional settings) seems to be substantial whatever 
the duration of the preparation interval. This indicates that preparation for a task switch 
remains a time-consuming process whether it is self-paced or constrained by the 
experimenter-imposed CSI. 
The evidence of this study indicates that on about 50% of the trials (the two 
longest CSI quartiles) participants took full advantage of self-paced preparation, making 
it possible on those trials to overcome the task-switch-related inertia in spatial attention 
observed with a fixed preparation interval. But does it also eliminate the residual switch 
cost in RT and errors? The answer is clearly “no”: there was still a substantial RT cost 
at the two longer CSIs where the attentional inertia effect was eliminated. The RT 
switch cost reduced by nearly two thirds from the shortest to the longest CSI, and this 
reduction (from 112 ± 16 ms when CSI = 466 ms to 45 ± 17 ms when CSI = 1134 ms) is 
proportionately larger than the reduction we observed previously with fixed CSIs (from 
124 ± 16 ms when CSI = 120 ms to 74 ± 11 ms when CSI = 1420 ms; Longman et al., 
2014). Using the same procedure as for the dwell-time index of attentional inertia (see 
above), we computed an average slope estimate of the RISC by subtracting the switch 
cost in the 4th CSI quartile from the switch cost in the 1st CSI quartile and dividing this 
by the difference in the mean CSI for the two quartiles; the same calculation was also 
done for the switch costs for the shortest and longest CSIs in Longman et al. (2014), 
Experiment 2. An independent t-test found the RISC slope to be steeper in the present 
experiment, t(40) = 3.29, p=.002. However, although numerically smaller by ~30 ms in 
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the present experiment when compared to the mean of switch costs in CSIs 1020 ms and 
1420 ms in Longman et al., (2014), Experiment 2 (a difference that did not approach 
significance, Switch by Experiment interaction, F(1,40)=2.04, MSE=1808.60, p=.16), 
the residual RT switch cost was a non-trivial and significant 45 ± 17 ms (38% of the 
switch cost in the shortest CSI). Thus, we must conclude that whilst self-paced 
preparation can eliminate “inertia” in the spatial attention parameters it is not sufficient 
to overcome other source(s) of the residual switch cost. 
Why is this? To return to the various candidate sources of the residual cost 
reviewed in the Introduction, if “inertia” in task-set parameters (Allport et al., 1994; 
Yeung & Monsell, 2003; Yeung et al., 2006) is responsible for the residual cost in RT, 
we lack a principled account of why self-paced preparation can completely overcome 
such inertia for one component – spatial attention – and not others (as reflected in the 
residual RT switch cost). Note that these “others” include other aspects of attention – 
there is clear evidence that residual switch costs in RT can arise in part from incomplete 
reorientation of attention to perceptual dimensions (Elchlepp, Best, Lavric, & Monsell, 
submitted; Mayr et al, 2013, Meiran & Marciano, 2002; Müller, Reimann, and 
Krummenacher, 2003), or to lexical versus perceptual attributes (Elchlepp, Lavric & 
Monsell, 2015), though we do not know whether self-paced stimulus presentation would 
change this. The same point can be made with respect to the claim that residual costs 
arise from associative retrieval of competing parameter values (Waszak et al., 2003, 
2005): if the presence of the stimulus is required for such associative retrieval, that may 
explain why the resulting conflict can be dealt with only after the stimulus onset, but 
that would appear to be true no less for attentional than for other parameters. An 
analogous argument applies to Mayr et al.’s (2014) similar attribution of switch costs to 
intrusions from long-term memory representations of competing task-set(s). And if, in 
De Jong’s (2000) terms, the pro-active TSR occasionally “fails to engage” for some 
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task-set components, but not others, why can this tendency be overcome by self-pacing 
for spatial attention, but not other task-set components? Finally, although it is 
straightforward, within a two-stage TSR accounts that distinguishes between pre- and 
post-stimulus TSR processes (e.g., Meiran et al., 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Rubinstein et al., 2001), to propose that some parameters (e.g., spatial attention) can be 
fully re-set before the stimulus onset given optimal preparation conditions, whereas 
others (e.g., S-R mappings) cannot, this is as arbitrary an assumption as those above. 
Thus any of the above theories of the residual task-switch cost requires augmentation to 
account for the present set of results; such augmentation may require data on the impact 
of self-pacing on the contribution of other aspects of task-set (including attention) to the 
residual cost. 
To conclude, we report here a condition under which it is possible to eliminate 
the effects of ‘attentional inertia’ on fixations – giving the participant ultimate control 
over the duration of the preparation interval. However, the benefits of this opportunity 
for preparation do not extend to at least some other components of the reconfiguration 
process (indexed by the performance switch cost and the delay in orienting to the 
relevant stimulus element). 
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Figure 1. The time-course of one trial with example displays. The dots used to identify 
where the digits would eventually appear were presented in light blue. Note that each 
frame shows only the central area of the screen. RFI = response-to-fixation cross 





Figure 2. Mean cue-stimulus interval (CSI; top), RT (middle) and error rate (bottom) as 
a function of CSI quartile and transition (switch, repeat). The column on the right shows 
the (switch-repeat) difference for the CSI durations and switch costs for the behavioral 




Figure 3. Dwell time per 20 ms (see text for definition) for 1420 ms following cue onset 
as a function of CSI quartile, transition (switch, repeat) and task-relevance of stimulus 
region. The left panel shows the fixations on both the relevant and irrelevant regions, 
whereas the right panel shows only the fixations on the irrelevant regions (with the scale 
adjusted accordingly). Thick vertical lines indicate the mean stimulus onset time, thin 




Mean (Standard Error) Difference (Previously Relevant-Previously Irrelevant) in Dwell 
Time in the Currently Irrelevant Regions on Switch Trials in the Early and Late Time 
Windows as a Function of CSI and RFI. 




700 28.74 (9.95) 5.21 (7.5) -0.69 (1.81) 0.18 (0.77) 
120
0 
22.43 (9.02) 5.53 (5.82) -3.49 (1.4) -0.3 (1.05) 
170
0 
23.44 (9.13) 4.87 (4.87) -0.37 (1.64) 0.07 (0.6) 
Mea
n 




700 -3.75 (2.52) 
-
10.07 
(4.93) -6.15 (3.25) -1.28 (2.54) 
120
0 
-1.66 (3.08) -3.69 (5.18) 
-
13.21 






(4.84) -1.97 (4.57) -4.13 (1.94) 
Mea
n 
-3.02 (1.81) -8.72 (3.47) -7.11 (2.84) -2.93 (1.48) 
 
 
 
